

Norway days
HSE, Moscow, St Petersburg
February 15-16, 2017

Lars Mjøset

Department of Sociology and Human Geography,
University of Oslo, Norway
lars.mjaset@sosgeo.uio.no

1

The Nordic models Ideas and realities

Einar Maseng, *Utsikt over de nord-europeiske staters utenrikspolitikk i de siste århundrer*. 3 volumes. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 2005. (Originally published in the 1960s)

Maseng's main question: How come that Norden did not become one big state (similar to Britain or France) in the European state system, but instead a "sub-state system" of five states?

The five Nordic state systems

Kalmar union 1397-1521 (Denmark, Norway, Sweden [with Finland])

The Nordic two-state system 1523-1814 (D [with N] and S [with F])

The Nordic three state system 1814-1917 (D, N, S, ÷F [with Russia])

The Nordic five state system 1918- (D, N, S, F, Iceland)

His studies the main historical turning points and finds that at these critical junctures, the European great powers – for various reasons that he analyses in detail – wanted to avoid a united Norden. For a review in English, see:

Mjøset, Lars (2003). "Norden in the European state system. A presentation of Einar Maseng's forgotten analysis", in Ralf Eriksson, Markus Jäntti & Johan Willner, editors, *Att förstå och förändra världen: En festskrift för Jan Otto Andersson*, Åbo Akademis Förlag, Turku 2003, pp. 161-206. [46 pages]

Prehistory of "Nordic model"

Childs, Marquis W.: *Sweden: The Middle Way* (Yale University Press, 1936).
More broadly: a concept of a "Third way" between a capitalist market economy and a socialist planned economy: a mixed economy based on a compromise between labour and capital as autonomously organized collective actors. A "people's home", but not based on paternalist submission of labour

Scandinavian inflation model/Rehn-Meidner model. Within *economics*, the emergence economic reasoning (Swedish/Austrian economists G. Rehn & R. Meidner working with the Swedish Labour Union Confederation in the 1950s and 1960s) and formal economic models (Norwegian economics O. Aukrust in the late 1960s) of wage formation in small open economies: export sector negotiations settles on the productivity-indexed wage, and this wage is generalized for the whole sheltered sector (all non-exporting activities not competing with imports)

Nordic cooperation in the postwar period – The Nordic Council in the 1950s and 1960s: passport union, common labour market. The Nordic Council of Ministers.

In the tables contained in this ppt, the following abbreviations are used:
D – Denmark, F – Finland, I – Iceland, N – Norway, S – Sweden.

Frequently used terms

- Nordic (Scandinavian) model [Scandinavia (NDS) ≠ Finland/Iceland]
- Nordic (Scandinavian) welfare model
- Social democratic model (regime)
- Protestant-social democratic model
- Institutional-redistributive model
- Encompassing model
- Non-Right model

Typology of welfare states: Nordic universalist, Continental-European Corporatist and Anglo-American residual (Esping-Andersen, *The three worlds of welfare capitalism*, Cambridge 1990, *Social foundation of postindustrial economies*, Oxford 1999)

Contrasts

- Liberal, residual, Beveridgian, Bismarckian, industrial achievement, radical, latin, southern, protestant-liberal, Christian-democratic, Anglo-Saxon, Corporatist/conservative, Continental, East-European, Basic security (welfare states), East Asian, Confucian

Post-war period

1950s and 1960s (especially Denmark, Norway, Sweden). Social democratic parties (government power over extended periods) identified as “socialist” and attacked as such by bourgeois parties.

Late 1960s and the 1970s: Social democrats criticized from the left by the New Left student revolters (general across the Western academic world)

Changing through the 1980s and emerging in the 1990s/2000s: the bourgeois parties (conservative and liberal parties) embrace of Anglo-American “neo-liberal” ideas are weakened, and in the end a number of center/right think tanks end up challenging the social democratic/left claims to the “Nordic model”. As an alternative, they claim that Liberal and Conservative parties in the Nordic realm have shared responsibility with the left/social democrats for the model – I e that it is basically “consensual”.

Example: journalist/cultural/literary public sphere

Conclusions from World Happiness Report (combining Gallup World Polls, World and European Value Surveys, European Social Survey, etc), as well as UN's Human Development Index, and others – the conclusion

”was as clear as a glass of ice-cold schnapps: the Scandinavians were not only the **most peaceful, tolerant, egalitarian, progressive, prosperous, modern, liberal, liberated, best-educated, most technologically advanced**, and with the best pop music, coolest TV detectives and even, in the last few years, the best restaurant, to boot. Between them, these five countries – Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Iceland – could boast **the best education system** in the world (Finland); a shining example of a properly **secular, multicultural, modern industrial** society (Sweden); colossal oil wealth, being invested in sensible, ethical, long-term things rather than silly tall buildings or Park Lane call girls (Norway); the most **gender-equal society** in the world, the longest-living men, and lots of haddock (Iceland); and ambitious environmental policies and generously funded welfare state systems (all of them).

Michael Booth, *The Almost Nearly Perfect People. The Truth About the Nordic Miracle*, London: J. Cape 2014, Ch. 1.

Example: Political public sphere: political parties

Webpage “Norden”, March 14, 2012

"Nordic model" patent dispute attracts international attention

The application submitted by the Swedish Social **Democrats to patent the term "the Nordic model"** has attracted media attention in several countries around the world – as well as in the Nordic countries.

In December 2011, the Swedish Social Democrats applied for a patent on the term "the Nordic model".

In the ensuing debate, it emerged that the party **believes that the special Nordic cocktail of the welfare state and market economics is mainly the result of endeavours of the labour movement in the 20th century.**

The Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers submitted a joint objection to the patent application last week, stressing that it is a legal matter.

"It seems both unreasonable in practice and wrong in principle that a national body should apply for a patent on a term already in common use in much broader circles throughout the Nordic Region," said the Director of the Nordic Council, Jan-Erik Enestam, and the Secretary General of the Nordic Council of Ministers, Halldór Ásgrímsson.

<http://www.norden.org/en/news-and-events/news/nordic-model-patent-dispute-attracts-international-attention>

Example: Economic actors

The next supermodel

Politicians from both right and left could learn from the Nordic countries

The Economist, Feb 2nd 2013

<http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21571136-politicians-both-right-and-left-could-learn-nordic-countries-next-supermodel#sthash.uwLkxpJY.dpuf>

...and earlier:

World economic forum Davos 2011

Shared norms for the new reality – The Nordic way

<http://www.globalutmaning.se/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Davos-The-nordic-way-final.pdf>

Example: Administration, bureaucrats, ministries

Webpage: “Values” of the Danish Presidency for the Nordic Council of Ministers 2015:

“Sustainable growth, innovation, climate and the environment, renewable energy, education, democracy, transparency, low levels of corruption, and relative gender equality. These are just some of the characteristics that the rest of the world associates with the Region, and **all of them stem from a set of fundamental Nordic values**. In the wake of the financial crisis, there is an increasing tendency for a range of countries **to turn to us as a source of inspiration for solutions to some of their own social challenges**. We need to attract even more positive international attention and make the most of it. The Danish Presidency will introduce long-term measures to focus strategically on **the international branding of the Region**. This will be done in accordance with the Council of Ministers’ Strategy for the international profiling and positioning of the Nordic Region, which highlights selected areas.”

<http://um.dk/en/foreign-policy/norden2015---eng/presidency-projects/values/>

Norden – dilemma for local social researchers

The best capitalism the world has ever seen (best in terms of accomodating the needs of the masses)? *Or*

A decadent chronic idyllic state of affairs, built on fossil fuels that creates global warming, rich on interests from an internationalized financial system that polarizes rich and poor countries, and quite well insulated from flows of desperate forced migrants heading for the rich world?

The following attempts a "balance": I accept, and try to explain the relative success of the Nordic countries as "varieties of capitalism" (first lecture).

In the second lecture, I consider the development of elite/social movement interaction, historically and in the contemporary situation, raising the important question: Will present day social movements prove to be equally successful?

Institutions

The dynamics of markets rely on the institutional complexes that stabilize them. These complexes consist of organisations, rules, laws, conventions, routines, measurement standards – as well as political institutions/units that sustain them.

Competence institutions are legal regulations and organisations that secure education, skill development and other types of knowledge that maintains the qualifications of the labour force.

Partnership institutions relates to nation building, administration and cooperation between organized groups. They promote citizens' capacity to be represented and to communicate/cooperate – either as voters that elect representatives or as members of organizations – with both private and public elites.

Social protection/security institutions are organisations and legal provisions that provide citizens with a measure of security against social/socio-medical risk factors (disability, ageing, unemployment, poverty), thus defining the welfare state

Four concepts of a "national"/"regional" model

A model of historical development (a strategy of development before such strategies could be implemented) (Rokkan: preconditions). Can developing countries learn from such a model?

Innovation system (a model for economic development, the relationship between sectors, repercussions from leading sectors, institutions that accommodate industrial transformation in order to adjust to external challenges, defined through the sequence of Schumpeterian "techno-economic paradigms")

A model of social protection/security (welfare state) – "decommodification" of life outside of the work situation, but consensus about permanent quest for productivity increases at the shop-floor level.

Model of social partnership – economic-political management of small, open economies, based on a constitution ("Main agreement") and a bargaining system between strong, well-organized collective actors (labour/capital, "class compromise").

Method

A conventional *generalizing* (nomological) approach would treat cases as a basis for the investigation of a limited number of *mechanisms*. These are generalized modules of explanation, and the researcher ideally simulates a contest between different combinations of mechanisms in order to arrive at the best explanation.

The analysis below is different in that it treats case outcomes as interesting in and of themselves, that is as *singular* outcomes. In this respect, the methodology is close to the discipline of history (*specifying*, ideographic), and the humanities in general focus on *singulars*.

However, the approach here is also *comparative*, employing macro-qualitative modelling. Such modelling does not employ mathematical formalisms, but periodization and typological differentiation.

There is little need for a separate sorting and display of abstract/formal mechanisms. However, because of the macro-qualitative modelling involved, the approach is more analytical than historical studies of isolated singular cases.

Explanation is approached through pairwise or clustered comparisons of a smaller number of cases, with reference to the macro-qualitative models. Explanation focuses on *turning points* and *transformations* in the development of institutional complexes.

The best explanations are judged with reference to the tracing of historical processes, mostly relying on the monographic work of historians, but also on a number of other sources, including descriptive quantitative data. Social science challenge

This leads to the program of analysing the Nordic models by means of *strong comparisons*

Strong comparisons

[1] First, strongly comparative studies must compare along a set of specified categories, reflecting properties of the cases. These are relative to the research question, which must be related to a core category, that is: to what the cases (the Nordic countries) are seen as cases of. Examples from research on Nordic models: historical development route, innovation system, welfare state, social partnership...

[2] Second, strongly comparative studies must refer to other (that is, non-Nordic) cases of the same. Only by referring to other kinds of the same, the influential mechanisms (configurations of factors) can be specified. This serves to block loose folk psychology generalisations, and/or thought experiments with little external validity.

[3] Third, strongly comparative studies must conclude in terms of periodized, contextualized generalizations that maintain, improve and extend the typologies that were relied on to begin with.

[4] Fourth, strongly comparative studies requires a mixed methods strategy, that is a combination of qualitative and quantitative social research. There are many specifications of such a strategy, but given that the comparisons relevant to the topic “Nordic model” are of the macro kind, we would require: Solid basis in descriptive statistics covering the same for each case (also inferential statistical exercises where this would be relevant); qualitative comparison of structures and timing based on the most reliable historical monographs.

Examples: Three early cases of strong comparisons

One interesting implication: Strongly comparative studies of the Nordic countries can not be found in studies that only cover all five (or fewer) of the Nordic countries.

In the following I give three examples: the contributions of philosopher/sociologist/political scientist Stein Rokkan (1921-79), Swedish sociologist Walter Korpi, and German political scientist Dieter Senghaas.

None of these comparative approaches were originally devised to account for Nordic developments, but the Nordic countries were cases included in a larger sample of comparative cases.

Examples of strong comparisons: including the Nordic countries

Walter Korpi, *The Democratic Class Struggle*, London: Routledge 1980.

Dieter Senghaas, *The European Experience*, Leamington Spa 1985.

Stein Rokkan, *State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999.

Gregory M. Luebbert, *Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press 1991.

Colin Crouch, *Industrial Relations and European State Traditions*. Oxford: Clarendon 1993.

Niels Kayser Nielsen, *Bonde, Stat og Hjem: Nordisk Demokrati og nationalisme – fra pietismen til 2. verdenskrig*, Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag 2009.

Torkel Jansson, Henrik Stenius, and other historians: the project on Nordic associations, conducted in the 1980s and 1990s. Several publications.

Lars Mjøset, "The Nordic Route to Development", Ch. 29 in Erik S. Reinert, Jayati Ghosh & Rainer Kattel & (red.), *Handbook of Alternative Theories of Economic Development*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2016, 533-569.

Is this all outdated “methodological nationalism”?

This criticism is unmerited. We have required that specification of the Nordic models must be related to periods, and periods must be defined by means of periodization of the relevant context for the development of the Nordic countries.

This requires comparison of periods in world history/the world economy, periodization of EU integration, periodization of great power interaction... The method of qualitative comparison will be the same, but we need to specify:

Inter-Nordic comparisons is not just the Nordic Council:

- meetings of layers/justice department bureaucrats (e.g. In social policies)
- meetings of employers associations
- meetings of labour union confederations

An international context of common challenges: The Cold War 1947-91 implies especially beneficial “Atlantic” conditions for the Nordic models: US technology transfers (mass production/mass consumption), Bretton Woods monetary system. Example: the case of Finland.

Conclusions

Maybe the Nordic model existed at some short point of time around 1970?

But if we rise the level of abstraction, maybe sufficient similarities to conclude for a longer period? If we lower it, any model disappears.

We probably do not need to decide this? Research is always done with reference to distinct research questions – so there may be more permanent Nordic models depending on what field we study? If we have the stamina to master more fields, we can provide more synthetic accounts.

But it will most likely be impossible to bridge the gap between a satisfactory social science definition of a “Nordic model”, and the varied popular uses of the term. But social scientists could reflect upon the challenges involved, and in that way maybe contribute to a reduction of the gap.

2

Elites and social movements in the historical development of the Nordic models

This analysis summarizes the following publication:

Mjøset, L. 2016. "Norden – internasjonale betingelser og sosiale bevegelser", Ch. 10, p. 219-244 in Ivar Frønes & Lise Kjøsørød, red., *Det norske samfunnet*, 7th ed, Vol 1, Oslo: Gyldendal 2016. (English translation available: "The Nordic models – historical dynamics and present challenges. An analysis with reference to international conditions and social movements")

Table 1. Periods of Nordic capitalism in a world-economic and geopolitical context

1. Long surges	2. Internationalization	3. Political system	4. Type of Nordic capitalism	5. Institutions	6. Aggregated	7. Dynamics
Preconditions	Mercantilist structuring of the world economy	Authoritarian absolutist		Family farms, church, state and dominant export sectors		
1 Textiles 1780s-	Napoleonic wars (protection, blockade, then opening)	Pre-democratic	Transitional, agrarian	Educational and other institutions of skill formation	Liberal	Peasants
2 Railways 1830s-	British hegemony Pax Britannica		Agrarian, peasant mobilization	Institutions of local governance		
3 Heavy engineering 1870s-	Weaker British hegemony. International gold standard	Emerging mass politics	Paternalist	Paternalist institutions at the firm level. Early social protection.	Corporate	Workers
3/4 War/inter-war period 1910s-	International fragmentation, collapse of world trade	Turbulent mass politics	Capitalism with fragile democracy	Institutions of social partnership. Social protection institutions revised		
4 mass consumption 1945-	Pax Americana. Peak of US hegemony. Open for trade, tight regulation of financial flows	Routinized democratic mass politics	Embedded	Institutions of social protection and social partnership generalized. Institutions of expert knowledge	Interventionist	New middle classes
5 ICT 1975-	US weakening – Coping with financial openness		Internationalized welfare	Regulatory institutions mitigating global/national processes		

Note: Long surges (techno-economic paradigms) follow Perez, C. 2002. *Technological revolutions and financial capital*. Cheltenham: Elgar. – 7. Dynamic indicates elite/movement-dynamic.

Source: Mjøset 2016, see reference on slide 19 above.

Use of macro-historical schemes to analyse the Nordic varieties of capitalism in the light of an ideal type of elite/social movement interaction

The macrohistorical schemes provides the context for an ideal type model of elite/movement interaction

Elite/movement-dynamics is the “engine”, the dynamics, at the national level. We use a terminology of “institutional designs”, but remember: institutions are largely the unplanned outcomes of social struggles. No singular “class” or “organic intellectuals” “planned” the system/”model”.

The left side of the scheme (technology/hegemony/democratization) are the external forces that the internal dynamic has to relate to.

Key features of the elite/movements ideal type process

Elites and movements differ in terms of how quickly they can influence the formation of institutions. Thus, following a *turning point*, *elite institutional designs* are instituted quite quickly. Elites have available resources and dominate the political system (their power resources can be immediately mobilized).

Social movements take more time to mobilize, since they need to accumulate their resources (which basically lies in organizing collective action based on large *numbers* of people). Thus, they *respond* to elite institutional designs, changing (renewing, modifying) them into compromise solutions that accommodate the interests of the mobilizing movements.

A major historical feature of the Nordic models is *openness to social mobilization by social movements that refers to major social conflict lines*.

Thus, let us introduce major social movements into our periodized scheme (table 1 above) of the Nordic models, relating them to the three types of institutional complexes: competence, partnership, protection.

The taxonomy of institutions

Capacity (-building) institutions (schools, other skills-related institutions, innovation and technology policies; includes systems of innovation, systems of competence building)

Social protection institutions: Health, ageing, family, social policies, social *insurance*

Social partnership institutions: Routines, formal agreements, legal provisions related to incomes policies. (But note: also earlier local government institutions.)

	Competence	Partnership*	Security	International
Before 1807	Protestant Christian, literacy	Absolutist state	Poor laws	British hegemony
1807-30	Mandatory primary schools			
1830-1870		Local government/representation	Paternalism in some firms	
1870-1914	Higher education, research	D: collective bargaining 1899	Early paternalist social policies, but universal age pension 1891/D	First period of globalisation after the industrial revolution
<i>Turning point</i>	<i>Democratisation**</i>			
1914-1945	Emergence of the expert role	Polarisation, but main collective bargaining institutions in N 1936 and S 1938	No major new developments until the late 1930s	Turbulence, countries insulated
1945-1975	More extensive expert-role, mixed elite	Collective bargaining, partnership	Generalization of the welfare state	US hegemony
	<i>The welfare-nation state established in Norden</i>			
1975-	PISA – research policies, innovation policies	Under pressure or revitalized?	Pension reforms	US heg, 2nd globalisation period

* Institutions of administration, nationbuilding, representation and cooperation.

** General suffrage men/women: D: 1915 [1849], N: 1913 [1900], S: 1920 [1911], F: 1906 [1906], I: 1920. In brackets; years of major extension of voting rights for men as a percentage of the electorate (population above the legal voting rights). (Source, Flora, 1983.)

Specification of the social movements analysed

In sum, the three (four) “old” social movements

- the revivalist-protestant movements/peasant movements
- the labour movement
- the women’s movement

These movements still have major influence, but no longer due to their movement form. They have power in the institutional complexes. (The womens’ movement may still be in a transition situation.)

In the following we distinguish three “new” social movements. To the extent that they exert influence (an empirical question) in the Nordic area today, they exert influence *as movements*, i.e. by responding to present elites’ proposed institutional designs.

The question is: *Will their influence lead to similarly robust institutions as we have so far seen with the “older” movements.*

The three new social movements are:

- anti-globalisation
- anti-waste
- anti-immigration.

Systematic comparison of the women's movement with the three new social movements

Of the new movements, anti-globalisation is only really influential in Iceland. But the environmental (anti-waste) and anti-immigrant movements are broadly influential.

The following schemes compare the most recent old (women's) with the three new social movements.

- (1) The movement's historical background, organisation and resources.
- (2) Social cleavage identified and the main arguments presented as the movement is on the way to gain influence
- (3) Relations to organisations/actors external to the movement 1: expert knowledge
- (4) Relations to organisations/actors external to the movement 2: political parties
- (5) Relations to organisations/actors external to the movement 3: bureaucracy

	Women's	Anti-globalisation	Anti-waste	Anti-immigration
(1) Historical background, developments, type organisation, resources	Suffragette roots. Feminist turn since the 1960s	Emerging as a response to financial deregulation 1980s/1990s.	Nature conservation from the 1960s, focus on global warming since the 1980s	Since early 70s in D and N (liberal), and F. Later in S. Shift to anti-immigration since the 1980s.
(2) Social cleavage, main arguments	Men <i>versus</i> women (patriarchy versus equal worth). Women decide on abortion. Strengthen women's position at home, in the workplace, in schools, organisations and pension systems	Winner <i>versus</i> losers from financial deregulation. Bretton Woods Atlantic/West European monetary system (1950s, 1960s) as benchmark	Present-day economic preferences <i>versus</i> the survival of humanity in the long term. The specific challenges of the anthropocene age. Accepts the IPCC early warnings. Concept of sustainability (ecosystem carrying capacity). Political measures against the waste problem, in particular the greenhouse created by CO ₂ and other climate gases	An immigration-complex <i>versus</i> non-organised resistance against immigration (e.g. in social media). Protect the nation-welfare state from unregulated immigration from regions with non-Western cultures

	Women's	Anti-globalisation	Anti-waste	Anti-immigration
(3) Relationship to expert knowledge	Relative consensus, strong contribution of gender studies in many disciplines, most tensions purely academic	Against the dominance of neo-classical economics "efficient market hypothesis".	Broad consensus, climate skeptics is a minority, but there is a paradox in public awareness about the problems*	Full polarisation: "the movement" (informally) rejects the IPCC research based
(4) Relations to political parties	Not successful as a base for separate political parties. All parties accept the basic arguments	Leads to formation of new parties in countries that are strongly affected by the international financial meltdown (Greece, Spain, Iceland)	Separate green political parties, but not large. Other political parties are not able to break the fossil basis of economic growth	New and very successful party formation. Impossible to form a broad anti-immigration movement in civil society
(5) Relations to bureaucracy	Symbiotic. State feminism. Policies of gender equality, family policies and gendered features of other social policies	Indirect, cf the strengthening of Financial Supervision Authorities	Close relationship, but measures are often turned into just "palliative" ones due to the political process	Ambivalent, like left-wing parties if included in government position.
Conclusion	Movement triggers reforms that are immediately efficient and that can be a paradigm to others		Local efficiency varies, cf denial psychology: often depends on strong actors succeeding in system shifts. But the movement may ally with business/ investors	May become effective at the local level, but such success may easily be undermined, e.g. due to regional instability, especially within the EU system.

* The "psychological climate paradox": the stronger the researchers' warnings, the smaller the share of the population that judge this to be the most important issue on the political agenda (Stoknes 2015)

Question already raised:

Will the influence of the new social movements lead to similarly robust institutions as we have so far seen with the “older” movements.

The next scheme compares the old and the new movements with reference to this question.

	Interfational/global feature	3
Anti-waste	Increasing CO ₂ emissions, tensions between emerging and developed economies	Global warming impacts on Norway
Anti-immigration	Migration systems into the EU and the US respectively	Norway's capacity to control immigration streams into the country
Anti-globalization	Intrnational financial instability	Norway's sovereign wealth fund

	Old	New
Main challenge	Offensive. Develop an egalitarian society [revision and extension of national legislation]	Defensive. Defend what the nation-welfare states have attained.
The relationship between elites and mobilizing groups	- related to national elites that could be clearly identified at the national level (political elite, the bourgeoisie, men)	- related to elites that are only small modules of international networks (CO ₂ -emitters, EU-elites, elites within international finance; but elites can also be defined in other ways; the populations of rich Western countries are elites themselves)
Cleavage lines	Could be sorted into simple categories such as “rich/poor”, “elites/grassroots”, “over-/under-privileged”, “male/female”	Lines are blurred: There are wage workers in the financial sector, and in businesses that emit a lot of greenhouse gases. In rich countries, the whole population is committed to a way of life dependent on fossil fuels. Critics of immigration only conceive as elites those that are considered responsible for liberal immigration and integration policies.
Relationship to expert knowledge	conflict lines that large groups experienced directly in their daily life	“Imagined” or “alleged” conflict must be interpreted by experts.

Conclusions on the future of the Nordic models

(1) Presently, the womens' movement is the only offensive movement after the 1980s that still retains the power to change institutions. We can not here pursue further the discussion of how long it will retain this power, that is, how long it will take until the the women's movement is entirely integrated into the "establishment".

(2) The new cleavage lines that have evolved since the 1980s seems no longer to spur mobilisation with reference to the concrete experience of tensions between elites and subordinate groups. These cleavage lines divide the population into more specific oppositions, and they are more dependent on how expert knowledge is interpreted.

(3) In contrast to the problems that the old movements related to, the problems defined and addressed by the new movements can only be fully solved if institutional changes occur in the international system.

A main paradox

This paradox follows from the third conclusion above.

The problems that the new movements address cut across the borders between states. They can only be fully dealt with through coordination at the international level.

The international system today – However, the transition from a period of globalisation to an inward-oriented period has so far – in the history of industrial capitalism – been associated with a weakening (and even breakdown) of such international coordination.

The Nordic models – Thus, even if both the anti-globalisation movement, the environmentalists and the critics of immigration got it their way at the Nordic level, the Nordic models would still remain exposed to risks of international financial instability, climatic challenges as a consequence of global warming, and risks of new immigration waves through escape routes into the EU/EEA-region.